External pressure is needed to help Italy tackle its persistent corruption problem by Capussela, Andrea Lorenzo & Intini, Vito
16/04/2015
External pressure is needed to help Italy tackle its persistent
corruption problem
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/04/16/external-pressure-is-needed-to-help-italy-tackle-its-persistent-corruption-problem/
Corruption has been a persistent problem in Italy, with the country receiving one of the lowest
scores of EU member states in Transparency International’s latest ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’.
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela and Vito Intini provide a comprehensive look at the problem, noting
that on several measures corruption has increased since the late 1990s. They argue that corruption
in Italy represents a ‘resilient equilibrium’, whereby the political system provides little incentive for
parties to tackle the problem. They suggest that external pressure from other countries in the EU
may oﬀer one route to breaking this cycle.
That corruption is widespread in Italy is well established, as are its harmful eﬀects on public ﬁnances, SMEs, the
quality of public investments, productivity, and trust in the country’s institutions. This in turn tends to increase
informality in the economy, which, in a vicious circle, will tend to keep corruption at high levels.
Nadia Fiorino, Emma Galli and Ilaria Petrarca have shown that corruption in Italy is negatively correlated with
economic growth for the period 1980-2004. According to Fabio Monteduro, if Italy had corruption scores similar to
those of the relatively more virtuous countries, its economy would have grown two to three times faster. In addition,
as Figure 1 indicates, citizens tend to show a lower level of satisfaction with democracy in countries where parties
rely more heavily on clientelistic strategies.
Figure 1: Relationship between clientelism and satisfaction with democracy in selected countries
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Source: Wang (2013)
Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption in Italy does not seem to be a cultural issue. According to the
latest survey by Eurobarometer, shown in Figure 2 below, Italian respondents are consistently below the EU average
in deeming corrupt practices acceptable.
Figure 2: Percentage of respondents ﬁnding corruption practices acceptable when dealing with their
country’s public administration
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Note: Each chart shows respondents’ views on whether doing a favour, giving a gift, or
giving money in dealings with their country’s administration is acceptable. Source:
Eurobarometer (2013)
A similar pattern emerges from an indicator of ‘civicness’ such as election turnout. In fact, turnout in Italy has
constantly been high for national, local, and European elections. In Figure 3 we just show trends for the European
Parliament, as these elections have historically been less inﬂuenced by voters’ attribution of blame for their socio-
economic conditions and, consequently, more likely to serve as an indicator of ‘civicness’. Although all countries’
trends are negative, Italy’s turnout still stands out.
Figure 3: Trend of turnout in European Parliament elections in selected EU countries
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Note: Compiled by the authors
When comparing two Italian regions normally viewed as opposite extremes in terms of social capital (Emilia
Romagna and Calabria), we can see that their trends in voter turnout in regional elections have both been negative,
with Emilia Romagna showing an accelerating trend in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Trends in turnout in regional elections in Emilia Romagna and Calabria
5/15
Note: Compiled by authors
If the diﬀusion of corruption is well established, however, less well known is that Italy exhibits remarkably weak
determination in ﬁghting it. And why this is so is as unsettling a question as it is underexplored. Our tentative
answer is based on the hypothesis that the diﬀusion of corruption – which we deﬁne, broadly, as the use of public
oﬃce for private gain – is an equilibrium outcome.
Indeed, based on the literature that originated from Seymour Martin Lipset, any rational person when pondering
whether to oﬀer (or accept) a bribe or not makes a cost-beneﬁt analysis, which includes the cost of being caught and
punished and the beneﬁt of corruption. The latter depends on, ﬁrst, a large public administration with relatively low-
paid civil servants; second, a highly regulated public sector; third, fast-changing legislation; fourth, a lack of ﬁrewalls
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between politics and businesses; ﬁfth, low social cohesion or social and political fragmentation, and economic
inequality; sixth, oligopolistic markets; and ﬁnally amoral familism.
This analysis in turn depends on the level of eﬀectiveness of the judicial system and the special protection treatment
provided to those who report such cases. We argue that Italy carries most of the above-mentioned characteristics
that tip the balance towards the beneﬁt side. Moreover, one additional point could be that in the 1990s there has
been a sudden retrenchment of the public sector, which, following the same logic that obtained in the former socialist
bloc, has given rise to more cases of corruption linked to privatisation and a shrinking ﬁscal space. As Figure 5
below, shows, the percentage of citizens in Italy who think it is likely that corruption will be punished is lower than the
EU average for both general and petty corruption.
Figure 5: Likelihood of being punished for general and petty corruption in France, Germany and Italy
Source: Eurobarometer (2012)
On the cost side of the analysis, the judicial system in Italy is characterised by relatively limited (ﬁnancial and
human) resources and ineﬃciencies, as the tables in Figure 6 show below.
Figure 6: Characteristics of the judicial system in Italy and comparison with France and Germany
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Source: Council of Europe (CoE – 2014)
Note: the category ‘other non-judge staﬀ’ includes assistants, receptionists, porters and
other judicial staﬀ. Source: CoE (2014)
Source: CoE (2014)
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Source: CoE (2014)
Source: CoE (2014)
As a result of the ineﬃciencies of the judicial system, among other factors, the intensity of corruption-related crimes
reported to the authority are the lowest of all types of crimes. Oﬃcial data published by the national statistical oﬃce
shows that the number of convictions per year declined by a factor of 14 between 1996 and 2012.
As a result, in 2010 Italy and Finland – the third least corrupt country in the world, according to Transparency
International’s latest data, and the second ‘cleanest’ in Europe – opened the same number of corruption
investigations, in per-capita terms (0.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, as Alberto Vannucci, a political scientist who wrote
extensively on corruption, recently noted; the number of convictions is also similar). This strongly suggests that
Italy’s repression system is currently gravely inadequate. The Table below illustrates this picture.
Table: Adults subject to investigations from judicial authority by committed crime (per 100,000 inhabitants)
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Note: Crimes related to corruption are highlighted in the table. Source: ISTAT
On the public opinion side of the analysis, Figure 7 below illustrates citizens’ opinions concerning some of the points
mentioned above.
Figure 7: Citizens’ views on the system being ‘unfair’ in selected countries (percentage who believe
statement to be true)
Source: PEW Research (2013)
In 1992–94 a series of investigations unveiled deeply entrenched corruption in many areas of the public sector. For
example, it emerged that almost every contract made by the public agency in charge of roads during the previous
two decades was tainted by corruption, through a well-organised cartel among infrastructure companies that had
entirely superseded the oﬃcial public procurement system.
The investigations – which came to be known as ‘Mani Pulite’ (Clean Hands) – unfolded during a period of
economic crisis and budget consolidation, and had political eﬀects that remain unprecedented in post-war Europe.
Besides sending much of Italy’s political establishment to trial, they provoked a wave of popular indignation that
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caused the sudden extinction of the ﬁve political parties that had governed the country since 1946 and led to the
birth of what came to be known as the ‘Second Republic’. Elections held in 1994 marked the rise of a fresh political
establishment and the emergence of a roughly bipolar political system (which recently seems to have morphed into
a more complex and ﬂuid system).
In the course of the following two decades, however, corruption rose. Figure 8 shows corruption cases per 100,000
inhabitants, while ﬁgure 9 is drawn from the World Bank Institute’sWorldwide Governance Indicators and measures
perceptions of corruption, which, given the characteristics of this phenomenon, are generally regarded – including
by Italy’s anti-corruption agency (see this methodological study, in Italian, and this interview) – as a reasonable
proxy for its actual diﬀusion.
Figure 8: Corruption crimes per 100,000 inhabitants in Italy
Source: ISTAT
Figure 9: Group trends in the perceived control of corruption in Italy
11/15
Note: The chart indicates a measure of the perception within a country of the control of
corruption (the lower the ﬁgure the less perceived perception of control there is). East
Europe refers to Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania,
Serbia and Turkey. Source: World Bank Institute
The two ﬁgures show specular trends of a reduction of corruption cases and a parallel improvement of the
corruption indicator by the late 1990s, which was followed by a reversing of the trend thereafter. Indeed, since 2000
the gap has almost trebled, leading Italy to levels of perceived corruption typical of Eastern European middle-income
transition countries.
These ﬁndings are corroborated by opinion surveys, such as those conducted by Eurobarometer; by Transparency
International’s latest Corruption Perceptions Index, published last December and therefore not included in the
indicator shown in Figure 9, which identiﬁes Italy as the EU’s most corrupt country, together with Bulgaria, Greece
and Romania; by oﬃcial reports, such as those of Italy’s supreme audit institution and of the European Commission;
and by the ample anecdotal evidence oﬀered by the corruption scandals that have dotted the past two decades.
Interestingly and in line with Lipset’s hypothesis, at the regional level corruption cases are consistently more
numerous in Lazio – Rome’s region – where all national ministries and agencies are located, and lowest in Emilia
Romagna, the region studied in depth by Putnam (1993) for its high level of social capital.
How, then, can the trend depicted by Figure 9 be explained? Control of corruption depends on several mutually
inﬂuencing variables, which include slow-moving factors such as social norms on the acceptability of bribery. Among
these variables are the adequacy and eﬃcacy of the legislative instruments to repress and deter corruption, which
inﬂuence the cost-beneﬁt analysis that corruption entails: they determine the probability of being caught and the
severity of the consequences. As these variables are relatively easy to measure and largely determined by political
choices we shall focus on them below.
The criminological and politico-economic literature shows that since 1994 Italy’s parliament has adopted a
succession of laws that have had the eﬀect – and sometimes the explicit purpose – of weakening the ﬁght against
corruption. In particular, parliament has cut the statute of limitations by half, leading many investigations to collapse
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or never to be opened; has complicated the procedural rules, allowing wider space for delaying tactics aimed
precisely at beneﬁting from the statute of limitations; has restricted the means of evidence that prosecutors can
employ; has eﬀectively de-penalised certain more easily detectable crimes that are typically ancillary to corruption
and can therefore signal it (the falsiﬁcation of a company’s accounts, primarily, which is necessary to create the
slush funds out of which bribes can be paid); and has continued the practice of entrusting large public works to
private ‘general contractors’, which spend public money under feeble safeguards.
This succession of laws was interrupted only in 2012, under a technocratic government, when parliament eventually
passed an anti-corruption law. Yet even this law is widely regarded as weak, primarily because it failed to reverse
any of the legislative choices already enacted.
In parallel to this legislative policy the number of corruption investigations and convictions declined sharply, as noted
above. This decline in the eﬀectiveness of the system is probably one cause of the rise in corruption over the past
two decades. And it is equally plausible that the succession of laws mentioned above is one important cause of the
reduced eﬀectiveness of the repression system. So there is very likely a causal link between those legislative
choices and the rise of corruption. But, if this was their eﬀect, why were such laws adopted and never reversed?
And how could the political élite get away with it?
A resilient equilibrium
The ﬁght against corruption was often high on the political agenda during the past two decades. The political system
that emerged after the 1992–94 investigations declared its full support for the repression of corruption and initially
hailed the prosecutors conducting it. But once the leader of the main centre-right party (Silvio Berlusconi) became
involved in some investigations the position of that party changed: most of the laws we mentioned above were
adopted by parliamentary majorities controlled by it, especially during the 2001–6 legislature.
Its centre-left opponents vehemently criticised those laws. But when they were in government they failed to reverse
any of them, even adding a few equally damaging ones, and otherwise did eﬀectively nothing to strengthen the ﬁght
against corruption. And the electorate has punished neither of the two coalitions for these choices, even though
segments of public opinion vocally denounced them.
The change in circumstances of a rather prominent target of the 1992–94 corruption investigations – one
Gianstefano Frigerio, then a member of parliament for the party (Christian Democrats) that had governed Italy since
1946 – can serve as an illustration of this evolution. In 1992–94 four separate corruption trials were opened against
him. One collapsed due to the statute of limitations, but in the other three he was found guilty. In 2001, when these
convictions were conﬁrmed in a third instance and became ﬁnal, he was elected to parliament again, in the ranks of
the centre-right party.
He obtained a reduction of the six-year jail sentence, its conversion into social work, and the acceptance that his
public service as a parliamentarian would count as social work: so he eﬀectively served his sentence by sitting in
parliament for a legislature, from which he emerged as a free citizen. In July 2014 he was arrested again, accused
of having acted as a mediator – together with another veteran of the 1992–94 investigations, a former member of
the main opponent of the Christian Democrats, the Communist party – in a wide corruption scheme concerning the
public works for the universal exposition that opens in May in Milan (‘Expo’, whose direct cost to the public purse,
narrowly deﬁned, approaches €2 billion).
This case is likely not unique and this person is still to be presumed innocent for this last episode. But if we assume,
for the sake of argument, that the charges are well founded, his story seems straightforward: if he could become a
legislator right after having been found guilty of corruption, and could serve his sentence by making laws for ﬁve
years (including several laws weakening the repression of corruption), it is hardly surprising that he would continue
a proﬁtable practice that society and the political system evidently tolerate and that the legal system eﬀectively failed
to punish.
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If we move from the hypothesis that corruption is an equilibrium outcome these apparently puzzling facts ﬁnd a
rather simple explanation. Where corruption is systemic, rarely punished and supported by tolerant social norms, it
becomes individually rational to engage in it, even though at a macro level corruption is ineﬃcient: it is a rational
choice not just for the companies and public oﬃcials that directly proﬁt from it, but also for the ordinary citizens who
resort to petty corruption to solve the everyday problems that an ineﬃcient public administration creates.
This, in turn, creates an adverse selection system in the sectors where corruption is widespread, whereby corrupt
companies, civil servants and politicians prosper, whereas ‘clean’ ones are at a disadvantage and are gradually
marginalised. And as these phenomena become entrenched and expand into other areas of the public sector, the
combined economic, social and political power of the groups that engage in corruption rises, further reinforcing the
system. So the resulting equilibrium is stable and resilient.
It follows that a government that wishes to shift the country from such an equilibrium to a low-corruption one faces a
diﬃcult and long-term struggle, because the means at its direct disposal – strengthening the laws and the criminal
repression system – are not suﬃcient: also social norms and agents’ expectations need to change. Otherwise the
equilibrium will eventually absorb the shock, adjust, and re-establish itself (the personal story we just described
illustrates this dynamic rather well).
This, indeed, is probably what happened during the past two decades. The 1992–94 was an unplanned, episodic
shock: a severe one, no doubt, but one that was not part of a deliberate, clear and credible political strategy to shift
the country to a low-corruption equilibrium. And the resilience of the existing equilibrium – due not just to the social
norms and individual incentives supporting it, but also to the political and economic power of the groups beneﬁting
from it – was such that it prevented the emergence of such a strategy.
So social norms and individual incentives and expectations did not change, the shock could be absorbed, and even
the governments and political forces that could have beneﬁted from ﬁghting corruption declined to do so: because of
the diﬃculty of the enterprise, whose time horizon exceeds the political cycle, and because of the strength of the
vested interest opposing such policies. Hence the rise of corruption measured – with a short time lag, presumably –
by ﬁgures 8 and 9, for the equilibrium is not static but dynamic, and corruption is a pervasive, self-replicating
phenomenon.
The current parliament has been discussing a set of anti-corruption measures for more than two years. The drafts
underwent successive changes, alternatively weakening and strengthening them. Besides genuine debate about
the merits of these measures, this back-and-forth probably also reﬂects an underlying struggle between forces
favouring the ﬁght against corruption and vested interests opposing it. The current government, which relies on a
broad parliamentary coalition, has not yet taken decisive action in one or the other direction. It is likely that these
laws will be adopted and that they will somewhat strengthen the ﬁght against corruption (one law on money
laundering has already been approved). Yet they are unlikely to establish a truly eﬀective prevention and repression
system.
Above all, the political system has not yet sent to Italian society a suﬃciently credible signal that it intends to shift the
country to a low-corruption equilibrium. Without such a signal it is unlikely that social norms and individual incentives
and expectations will begin to change. And it is therefore likely that the existing equilibrium shall persist, despite its
very harmful eﬀects on economic productivity, public ﬁnances and social cohesion.
If, as seems to be the case, the political system is unable alone to begin that shift, the reduction of corruption to
physiological levels will depend on a change in social norms, which education and public debate might induce, or on
pressure from the electorate. But citizens face severe collective action problems, and a spontaneous change in
social norms under the existing equilibrium is a long-term prospect.
It is possible, however, that assistance can also come from abroad. If it is true that Italy’s high debt-to-GDP ratio is
the gravest threat to the survival of the euro (and, therefore, also of the European Union), and if it is true that
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corruption weighs heavily on both the numerator and the denominator of that calculation, then it ought to follow that
it would be in the interest of every European to assist Italy in shifting to a low-corruption equilibrium. External
pressure could therefore assist those forces, in Italian society, that seek to overcome the vested interests that
impede such a shift. Combined pressure from below and from outside, within the framework of an open and
reasonable public debate, might perhaps be able to achieve what the Italian political system seems now incapable
of.
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